

which was, on the whole, friendly to the Allies. The affair would, to the outside world, have an unpleasant resemblance to the conduct of the German *prohibit* mans in Belgium. But we were justified in adopting every measure necessary to protect our troops against the danger of sudden attack on their most vulnerable flanks. After the events of 1st December, therefore, we had imposed a severe blockade on Greece, which we were maintaining until we should be satisfied that the King had taken the necessary steps to clear up the position.

I did my best to reassure General Sarrail, and obtained his promise that he would take no action without first communicating with me. It seemed fairly certain that the pressure of our blockade would compel the Greek Government to carry out our terms, even if rather slowly and unwillingly.

I saw a good deal of Sarrail at this Conference. He made no complaint about his superiors, although he might have done so, for no General in *His difficult* the War was accorded meaner treatment. *position* He was landed in an enterprise which could barely have succeeded when he took over the command if there had been abundant resources at his disposal. He was left without a competent Staff, and with a wretched equipment whether for fighting or for transport. His

troops were
far from being a good specimen of an
average French
Army. Even thus they were far below
strength. He
was expected to attack almost inaccessible
defiles well
entrenched, with a wretched quota of
heavy guns and
little ammunition. His British Allies were
kept in the
same condition of inadequacy and
unpreparedness